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INTRODUCTION AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Pursuant to Rule 3 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
a petition for rehearing must outline issues of law and/or fact 
which the petitioning party believes the court overlooked or 
misapprehended. This the Appellees simply do not do. (The 
Appellees/Defendants shall sometimes be referred to as "Physicians" 
and Appellant/Plaintiff shall sometimes be referred to as 
"Rehabilitation". 
To begin with, the Appellees argue that the primary issue on 
appeal is not whether there has been a "sale" in the abstract 
sense, but whether the transaction satisfied the intent of the 
parties. This has, at all times, been the primary issue in this 
case, and the argument is circuitous because the intent of the 
parties must first be determined from the four corners of the 
document. Therefore, the argument leads us right back to paragraph 
11 in which the parties define the meaning of "sale". The 
definition is not abstract, but expressly set forth by the parties. 
Further, the language of paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement 
does not distinguish between a transfer to a "third party" and one 
to a "separate legal entity". Frankly, the Appellants do not 
believe that a distinction, if any, between these two terms has any 
relevance to the interpretation of the purchase agreement. But in 
any event, this is not an area which the court overlooked or 
misapprehended. 
Next, the Appellees argue that a joint venture is not a 
separate legal entity from its partners for purposes of 
interpreting the Termination Argument. This argument is simply not 
supported by the law (and Appellees do not cite any) . Instead, the 
law clearly establishes that a joint venture is a separate legal 
entity. The Appellees cannot pick and choose when a joint venture 
is an independent legal entity and when it is not. Partnership law 
defines the rights and obligations, not only between a joint 
venture and third parties, but also between joint ventures and 
their partners. For example, a partner cannot use partnership 
property for personal gain unless the use is approved by the 
partnership. Therefore, this is not an issue of law or fact which 
the court overlooked or misapprehended. 
Third, the Appellees attempt to draw a distinction between a 
de facto joint venture and a " [mere] change in the form" of the 
joint venture upon the formation of Sports Medicine West. How this 
is relevant is not clearly set forth. However, if a de facto joint 
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venture is anything like a de facto corporation, it remains a 
separate legal entity. In addition, this argument is clearly 
contrary to the law as set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Verhoef v. Aston, 740 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1987) to the effect that all 
documents in a transaction must be construed together. Therefore, 
this is not an issue which the court overlooked or misapprehended. 
Finally, the Appellees argue that there are factual issues in 
dispute which require a remand of the entire case. This is simply 
not appropriate, as it is the first time Physicians has made this 
argument. While less than artfully drafted, the Termination 
Agreement is not ambiguous in its application to the facts of this 
case. It is interesting to note that the Appellees have never, 
throughout this entire process, argued that genuine issues of 
material fact precluded Summary Judgment. In addition, the 
Appellees have not challenged or distinguished the case of Verhoef 
v. Aston, supra, which requires that agreements executed 
contemporaneously and which are clearly interrelated must be 
construed together. If all of the documents executed by Physicians 
on May 24, 1990 are considered together, and if joint ventures are 
separate legal entities, then there are simply no factual issues in 
dispute. Thus, there is no issue here which the court overlooked 
or misapprehended. 
As a result of the foregoing, it is clear that the Appellees 
have raised no issues of law or fact which the court overlooked or 
misapprehended. At best, the Appellees have reargued the 
dissenting opinion. Since the court has already fully considered 
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issues raised by the dissent, the petition must be denied. In 
fact, Rehabilitation submits that, despite the certification to the 
contrary, this petition was not brought for a proper purpose. 
Rehabilitation would request an award of its costs and fees 
incurred in responding to it. 
ARGUMENT I 
THE COURT DID NOT MISCONSTRUE THE TERMINATION AGREEMENT 
In the course of arguing that the court misconstrued the 
Termination Agreement, the Appellees argue that a "third party" is 
somehow different than an "independent entity". However, they 
offer absolutely no basis for making this distinction. Instead, 
the argument ignores an overwhelming weight of legal authority to 
the contrary. 
Beginning first with one of the Utah Supreme Court cases cited 
by the majority in the opinion issued in this case, in Wall 
Investment Co. v. Garden Gate Dist. Inc. 593 P.2d 542, 543 (Utah 
1979), the Supreme Court states unequivocally that "a partnership 
[is] a legal entity distinct from its partners." (See also 
Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499 (Utah 1988) . Of course, 
the law governing partnerships is equally applicable to joint 
ventures, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-3.1 (1994). 
Turning next to the statutes governing partnerships and joint 
ventures: 
1. Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-5 (1994), 
property transferred by a partner to a partnership ceases 
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to be personal property and it becomes "partnership 
property". 
2. Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-6 (1994) , a partner 
is an "agent" of the partnership. 
3. Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-22 (1994) , a partner 
has possessory rights in specific partnership property only 
for partnership purposes and for no other purposes without the 
express consent of the partners; these partnership rights are 
not individually assignable; the rights are not subject to 
attachment or execution for a personal debt; and the rights 
are not devisable to the partner's heirs upon his death. 
Despite the overwhelming weight of legal authority that a 
partnership and a joint venture are independent and separate 
entities from their partners, the Appellees argue that Sports 
Medicine West should not be considered separate for the sole 
purpose of interpreting the Termination Agreement between these 
parties. By so doing, the Appellees attempt to receive the 
benefits of their decision to form a joint venture and avoid the 
consequences. The argument is without merit and would lead to 
absurd and unjust results. 
Turning next to the Appellees' three illustrations, which 
purportedly demonstrate the fallacious conclusions which would 
result from this court's opinion: 
1. Under the facts outlined in exemplar 1, Rehabilitation 
would submit that it is appropriate to conclude that if Physicians 
transferred all of its assets to a corporation, it would be a sale 
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as that term is defined in the Termination Agreement. Goodwill is 
an asset transferred in consideration for issuance of stock. 
Operational control would be in the hands of the corporation, which 
potentially would result in business, liability and tax benefits 
for the stockholders. Issues of fact would remain as to the value 
of the consideration for transfer of the stock, and whether there 
was value to which Rehabilitation would be entitled to share. 
2. Exemplar 2 lacks credibility. First, it does not explain 
why Drs. E, F, & G are limited partners without paying any 
consideration for their limited partnership interests. Second, an 
attorney for the limited partnership would surely recommend that 
the entity enter into a management agreement with Physicians just 
as Sports Medicine West did in this case. If the doctors did in 
fact pay consideration for their limited partnership interests; if 
the facts established that the amount was based on transfer of good 
will; and if the entity assumed operational control; then to 
conclude that this transaction constituted a sale as defined by the 
parties would not be a fallacious conclusion. 
3 . The same inconsistencies apply to exemplar 3. Why would 
a third party become a member of a limited liability company 
without payment of consideration for an interest in an entity which 
owns assets, including what is obviously very valuable good will? 
As outlined above, if consideration is paid, goodwill transferred, 
and operational control vested in the limited liability company, 
then it would appropriately be classified as a sale under the 
Termination Agreement. 
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All three exemplars ignore at least one other indisputable but 
very important fact. The Termination Agreement would have expired 
by its own terms within 2 years from the date it was signed on May 
22, 1989. Physicians were therefore in complete control of their 
obligation to pay Rehabilitation. Had Physicians simply postponed 
the formation of and the sale to the joint venture for a year, 
Rehabilitation would have had no claim to any amounts paid in 
consideration for the transfer of good will. Physicians cannot 
claim an injustice where their own failure to consider 
Rehabilitation's rights under the Termination Agreement resulted in 
the liability at issue. 
ARGUMENT II 
THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
Suddenly, Physicians seeks to establish material issues of 
fact by arguing that the court did not consider the intent of the 
parties. At no time prior to this petition have they done so. 
First, intent must be determined from the four corners of the 
documents. As Appellees have argued all along, the Termination 
Agreement is not ambiguous, and parol evidence is inadmissable to 
alter its terms. 
Looking at the language at issue, there is absolutely no basis 
to argue that the parties intended to include within the definition 
at issue a requirement that Physicians have no further 
"involvement" in "that business". Instead, the language requires 
a transfer of complete operational control. These terms are 
clearly not synonymous. Had the parties intended what Appellees 
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now argue, they could have said so in the Agreement. In addition, 
since the Agreement was drafted by attorneys for Appellees, it must 
be construed against them. Therefore, there are no disputed issues 
of fact. 
As a subnote to this argument, the Appellees attempt to claim 
that they had filed a Rule 56(f) motion to the effect that they had 
not completed discovery. However, the motion at issue related to 
discovery on Physicians' counterclaims and not on the issues before 
this court. The counterclaim was dismissed based upon the 
stipulation of the parties, and the motion is therefore, 
irrelevant. 
ARGUMENT III 
THE TRANSACTION WAS NOT A RECAPITALIZATION 
Next, Appellees argue that the transaction at issue was merely 
a recapitalization of a defacto joint venture formed when one half 
of the assets were transferred to IHC. This argument lacks factual 
and legal support. Primarily, it ignores the primary case relied 
upon by Rehabilitation, Verhoef v. Aston, 740 P. 2d 1342 (Utah 
1987), where the Utah Supreme Court held: 
Contracts should be construed so as to give 
effect to the parties intentions, and such 
intent should be determined, if possible, by 
examining the written agreement executed by 
the parties. When agreements are executed 
'substantially contemporaneously and are 
clearly interrelated, they must be construed 
as a whole and harmonized, if possible.' 
Id. at 1344. (quoting Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National Bank, 737 
P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987).) 
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The Asset Purchase Agreement and the myriad of other documents 
executed by the parties on May 24, 1990 must be construed together 
as one transaction, and the Appellees cannot, under any theory, 
consider the Asset Purchase Agreement as a separate transaction. 
As such, the court was correct in concluding that the entire 
transaction constituted a sale as this term was defined by the 
parties in the Termination Agreement, thus entitling Rehabilitation 
to a portion of the consideration paid for good will. 
ARGUMENT IV 
THE DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR IN CAMERA REVIEW 
ONLY SUPPORT THE COURT'S DECISION 
Finally, Physicians argues this court did not have the entire 
record to review. This is a curious approach given that the 
documents were originally submitted by Rehabilitation in support of 
its motion for summary judgment. After supplementing the record on 
appeal with a multitude of documents, Physicians still can only 
cite one small statement which they claim supports their position. 
However, the language quoted merely outlines how decisions will be 
made by the Joint Venture. This language does not, in any way, 
alter the law as previously set forth in this brief that the Joint 
Venture is an independent, third party entity. In addition, the 
bulk of the documents supports Rehabilitation's position. Simply 
by way of example: 
1. The Joint Venture Agreement and the Management Agreement 
have both been previously and extensively briefed and argued by 
Physicians, but it is important to emphasize here that both 
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repeatedly refer to the Joint Venture as the "owner" and Physicians 
as the "agent". 
2. Judging from the language in the document entitled 
"Addendum to Purchase Agreement", the parties obviously considered 
it necessary to specifically delineate responsibility between 
Physicians and the Joint Venture for payment to a third party 
pursuant to a contract entered into by Physicians. 
3. The parties also felt it was necessary to execute a 
written sublease between Physicians as sublessors and Sports 
Medicine West as sublessees. 
These are only a few examples. The documents overwhelmingly 
establish that the parties to the transaction between IHC and 
Physicians treated the Joint Venture as a separate entity. Having 
reaped the benefits of this treatment, Physicians cannot now argue 
otherwise to avoid the obligations. 
As part of this argument, Physicians also claims that use of 
the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" by the Joint Venture is 
not the same as ownership of the name. Like the other arguments 
made by Physicians, this one has no legal and factual basis. It is 
clear from the documents that Physicians exempted no assets from 
the sale and that the sale was all inclusive. It is of course 
undisputed that the name did not change for at least four months 
after the sale. If the court alters its opinion in any way, it 
should expressly recognize that this period of time is sufficient 
as a matter of law to establish this one last requirement under the 
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Termination Agreement. Therefore, the only issue on remand should 
be the amount due Rehabilitation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellees raise no issues which the court overlooked or 
misapprehended. The Termination Agreement must be interpreted from 
the language used by the parties to outline their rights and 
responsibilities. In determining whether the transaction between 
IHC and Physicians constituted a sale as defined in paragraph 11, 
the Court must construe all documents executed on May 24, 1990 
together as one transaction. Since there is no legal authority to 
argue that the Joint Venture is not a separate, independent entity 
from Appellees, the Court reached the only conclusion it could 
under the law. Rehabilitation requests the Court deny the Petition 
for Rehearing and award Rehabilitation its costs and fees incurred 
in defending against it. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ;^Cday of March, 1996. 
LUHN, P . C . 
KIJjkM. LUHN 
)HN C. GREEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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